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This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality 
of opportunities for income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 
nineties. We develop a new definition of equality of opportunity and show 
how it can be implemented empirically. Equality of opportunity is defined as 
the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be 
ranked according to stochastic dominance criteria. Stochastic dominance is 
assessed using non-parametric statistical tests. We measure social origin by 
parental education and occupation and use national household surveys to 
assess inequality of income and opportunities. USA and Italy show up as the 
most unequal countries both in terms of outcome and opportunity. At the 
opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are very 
close in Scandinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. The 
analysis highlights that inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity 
can sometimes lead to different pictures. For instance, France and Germany 
experience a similar level of inequality of income but the former country is 
much more unequal than the latter from the point of view of equality of 
opportunity. Differences in rankings according to inequality of outcome and 
inequality of opportunity underscore the importance of the policymaker's 
choice of the conception of equality to promote. 
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As income inequality has risen to the top of the social agenda in many countries, the
need for international comparisons has become all the more pressing. Such comparisons
provide indications on how di￿erent social systems or policies cope with income inequality.
Focusing on developed countries, recent studies (Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997; 2000))
have established important di￿erences across countries in the level of income inequality,
with the USA and Great-Britain being more unequal than most continental European
countries, which in turn are more unequal than the countries of Northern Europe.
Although such evidence is informative, it may be criticized for not measuring the
kind of inequalities that are relevant from a social, economic or moral perspective. So far,
most studies have concentrated on what could be called inequality of outcome, that is, ￿nal
inequality resulting from the economic, demographic and social process which generates
the distribution of income. This concept of inequality has been used for decades and is easy
to grasp. However, it does not re￿ect the views of inequality that are held in the current
intellectual and social debates. For instance, in￿uential philosophers such as Dworkin
(1981), Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989) have put the issue of personal responsibility at the
forefront of the debate on equality. According to them, economic and social policies should
only try to promote equality of opportunity. This amounts to compensate inequality
stemming from factors beyond the scope of individual responsibility ( circumstances in
the terminology introduced by Roemer), while letting, at the same time, individuals bear
the consequences of factors for which they can be held responsible. This line of thought
was recently introduced in the economics literature by John Roemer in several important
theoretical and empirical contributions (Roemer, 1998; Roemer, 1993) and Roemer et al.
(2003).
Overall, this suggests that greater attention should be paid to the role played by per-
sonal responsibility and external factors in observed inequality. In fact, the importance of
such an analysis is enhanced by the observation that there is no a priori reason to suspect
that equality of opportunity is related to the degree of equality of outcome. Indeed, if
some countries tend to promote equality of opportunity over equality of outcome, one may
1observe a somewhat di￿erent ranking of countries according to the two criteria. Further-
more, from a normative perspective, it has been emphasized that equality of opportunity
is consistent with any degree of inequality of outcome. 1 Similar uncertainty as to the
relationship between the two notions of inequality has also been recently expressed, from
a positive point of view, in the economic literature. While some authors have suggested
that higher inequality could increase the incentives to intergenerational mobility and con-
sequently lead to greater equality of opportunity, others have also stressed that higher
inequality could raise the constraints to mobility and decrease equality of opportunity 2.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Its ￿rst objective is to o￿er an international
comparison of inequality that echoes more closely the views on inequality held in contem-
porary societies and that is consistent with modern theories of justice. For this reason,
we measure and compare the extent of equality of opportunity for income acquisition in
developed economies. This complements results already obtained regarding the compari-
son of inequality of disposable income. The second objective is to examine how countries’
performance in terms of equality of opportunity relates to their degree of inequality of
outcome.
Analyzing the extent of equality of opportunity for income acquisition remains a chal-
lenging problem and only few recent analysis have addressed it (See Roemer et al. (2003)
and Bourguignon et al. (2003)). In particular, de￿ning the set of relevant circumstances
and measuring their contribution to observed inequality is certainly not an easy task; dif-
ferent methods have been suggested in the literature. In this paper, we focus on individual
socio-economic family-background, as it is a source of inequality that all authors would
agree to be an important dimension of the individuals’ circumstances, at least in western
societies. The de￿nition of inequality of opportunity used here borrows from a companion
work (Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy, 2004a). This de￿nition rests on the notion of con-
ditional (in)equality. We take the view that studying inequality of opportunity reduces
to a comparison of the distributions of income, conditional on individual socio-economic
background.
1Hild and Voorhoeve (2004)
2Seen for instance the opposing views developed in Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999), Solon
(Solon, 2004), and Hassler, Mora and Zeira (2000)
2In this paper, we use a data set gathered by Roemer et al. (2003) that conveys infor-
mation on individual income and socio-economic background in nine countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Great-Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United-
States. It contains detailed information on most sources of individual income, as well as
information, albeit more limited, on the education of the father of the respondent.
Since our data di￿er from those commonly used in international comparisons of in-
come inequality, we ￿rst check that they deliver results on inequality of outcome that
are comparable to those found in the literature, before turning to the analysis of equality
of opportunity. With respect to inequality of disposable income, we also rank countries
according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance which is known to be a more robust proce-
dure than ranking by the ordering of inequality indexes. In the comparisons of inequality
of outcome and inequality of opportunity we pay particular attention to issues of sta-
tistical inference, in contrast to many empirical analysis. To this end, we implement
robust non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance that have been developed recently
(Davidson and Duclos (2000)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the de￿nition of
equality of opportunity for income acquisition, the statistical procedure and an index of
inequality of opportunity. The data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses inequal-
ity of outcome. Section 5 compares inequality of opportunity among the nine countries
and analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities.
The last section concludes.
2 From inequality of outcome to equality of opportu-
nity : de￿nition and measurement
When measuring inequality of outcome in empirical work, a wealth of di￿erent approaches
and indexes can be used. On the contrary, when departing from the analysis of outcome to
examine opportunity, one ￿rst requires to provide a de￿nition of equality of opportunity
that can be implemented empirically.
32.1 De￿nition of equality of opportunity
2.1.1 De￿nition
Equal-opportunity theories di￿erentiate between two fundamental sources of inequality
among individuals: on the one hand, factors outside the realm of individual choice, usually
referred to as circumstances; on the other hand, factors that individuals can be judged
responsible for and that can be generically referred to as e￿ort. One important prin-
ciple emphasized by equal-opportunity theories is that di￿erences in circumstances are
not a morally acceptable source of inequality. On the contrary, inequality arising from
di￿erences in e￿ort need not be corrected. As a consequence, any level of inequality of
outcome can be compatible with equality of opportunity. However, when equality of op-
portunity prevails, no particular vector of circumstances should provide individuals with
an advantage over any other vector. This characterization allows us to derive a condition
for equality of opportunity that can be implemented empirically. 3
In order to derive this condition, one ￿rst needs to be more speci￿c about the notion
of advantage that some circumstances s may provide over some other circumstances s0.
Consider the situation where individuals would be allowed to choose their circumstances
(before knowing the level of e￿ort they will exert). In this context, we say that s provides
some advantage over s0, if all individuals prefer the opportunity set associated with s to
the one associated with s0. Consequently, we say that equality of opportunity prevails
between circumstances s and s0 if s is not preferred to s0 by all individuals, and vice versa.
In the case of income acquisition, the opportunity set o￿ered to an individual with
circumstances s can be summarized by the distribution of income x conditional on s,
denoted F(x|s). Let S denote the set of all possible vectors of circumstances. Choosing
among elements of S amounts to choose among income lotteries whose distribution is
given by F(x | s). Obviously, the characterization of equality of opportunity outlined in
the previous paragraph is contingent upon the preferences used to rank these lotteries.
A desirable property of the characterization of equality of opportunity is that it holds
for a su￿ciently broad class of preferences. In this paper we use stochastic dominance
3This characterization of equality of opportunity is developed in greater details in Lefranc, Pistolesi
and Trannoy (2004a).
4criteria to rank the opportunity sets o￿ered by di￿erent circumstances. We assume that
individual preferences agree with the criteria of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance ( FSD)
and second-order stochastic dominance ( SSD). We now de￿ne FSD and SSD, for two
lotteries F(x|s) and F(x|s0) and explain what restrictions on preferences they imply.
De￿nition 1 The circumstances s FSD-dominate the circumstances s0 (s FSD s0)
i￿:
F(x | s) ≤ F(x | s0) ∀x ∈ R+.
Strict dominance (s FSD s0) requires that for some x, strict inequality prevails. It is
well known that under Expected Utility Theory (EUT), any individual whose utility func-
tion is increasing in x will prefer a FSD-dominating distribution over a FSD-dominated
one. The FSD criterion determines a partial ranking on the set S of possible circumstances
S. Non-dominated circumstances can be de￿ned for the binary relationship FSD as
P1 = {s ∈ S | @s0 ∈ S such that s FSD s0}. (1)
The FSD criterion is very demanding, when comparing lotteries, since it requires the
unanimity of decision makers regardless of their attitudes towards risk (i.e. be them
risk-loving, risk-averse or with varying attitude towards risk).
A less partial ranking can be de￿ned using the SSD criterion, which allows to partially
rank lotteries even when FSD is not satis￿ed.




F(y | s)dy ≤
Z x
0
F(y | s0)dy ∀x ∈ R+. (2)
In the EUT framework, any risk-averse individual whose utility function is increasing
in x will prefer a SSD-dominating distribution over a SSD-dominated one.
Shorrocks (1983) has shown that SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz (GL) domi-
nance. Formally :
∀x ∈ R+ s SSD s0 ⇔ ∀p ∈ [0,1] GLF(.|s)(p) ≥ GL
F(.|s0)(p) (3)
5with GLF(.|s)(p), the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at p for the distribution
F (. | s).
The set of non-dominated circumstances for SSD, P2, may be de￿ned in a similar
way to P1. Since SSD is a less partial criterion than FSD, we have P2 ⊆ P1.
We are now able to o￿er a formal de￿nition of equality of opportunity according to the
SSD criterion. We say that equality of opportunity is achieved when no s is dominated
for the SSD criterion. Formally 4 :
De￿nition 3 Equality of opportunity is achieved whenever P2 ≡ S.
This de￿nition is equivalent to saying that an individual choosing among all possible
circumstances is unable to rank them using the SSD criterion.
2.1.2 Discussion
Three aspects of our de￿nition of equality of opportunity are worth emphasizing. 5
First, our de￿nition admits as a special case the equality of conditional distributions,
i.e. when for all (s,s0) in S2, and for all x, F(x | s) = F(x | s0). In such a situation,
circumstances have no impact on the distribution of income. This represents a compelling
case of equality of opportunity and corresponds to the de￿nition of equality of opportunity
adopted by Roemer (1998). It may be seen as a situation of strong equality of opportunity.
Of course, such a situation is unlikely to be satis￿ed in practice. In this perspective, our
de￿nition of equality of opportunity is less stringent and corresponds to a weaker form of
equality of opportunity.
Second, when our de￿nition of equality of opportunity is not satis￿ed, it must be the
case that some circumstances s dominate some circumstances s0 according to the SSD
4The following, more detailed, characterization is equivalent :for any s,s0 ∈ S, there is always x and
x0 ∈ R+ such that
Z x
0
F(y | s)dy ≥
Z x
0
F(y | s0)dy and
Z x0
0
F(y | s0)dy ≥
Z x0
0
F(y | s)dy (4)
and, if ∃x ∈ R+ |
Z x
0
F(y | s)dy >
Z x
0
F(y | s0)dy (5)
then ∃x0 ∈ R+ |
Z x
0
F(y | s)dy >
Z x
0
F(y | s0)dy. (6)
5A fourth aspect worth mentioning is that our de￿nition only rests on ￿rst and second order stochastic
dominance. One could resort to higher order stochastic dominance but the relevance of such extensions
may be disputed, given the restrictions they imply for individual preferences.
6criterion. Schematically, this may occur for two reasons. The returns to the lottery
attached to s may be higher than those of s0 or the risk of the lottery attached to s may
be lower than that of s0. The FSD criterion only rests on the comparison of returns, while
the SSD criterion takes both returns and risk into consideration. However, it may be
informative to assess the degree of risk of each lottery, regardless of its return. This can
be performed by comparing the conditional distributions centered on their mean, using
the standard Lorenz criterion. 6 Let LF(.|s)(p) denote the value of the Lorenz curve at p
for the distribution F (. | s), the s lottery’s will be said to be less risky than that of s0 if :
∀p ∈ [0,1], LF(.|s)(p) ≥ L
F(.|s0)(p)
Third, the de￿nition of equality of opportunity, either strong or weak, is contingent
on the de￿nition of the relevant circumstances. However, given data limitations, it is
unlikely that all circumstances will, in practice, be observable. Any concept of equality of
opportunity has to cope with incomplete information. And one may wonder if incomplete
observation of the relevant circumstances may distort the empirical assessment of equality
of opportunity. We address this issue in a companion paper (Lefranc et al., 2004a) and
show that the two concepts of equality of opportunity brought out here are fairly robust
to an incomplete description the circumstances .
2.2 Measurement
2.2.1 Stochastic dominance tests
The condition developed in the previous paragraph suggests a natural empirical test to
assess whether equality of opportunity prevails: ￿rst, estimate the conditional income
distributions associated with observed circumstances and then compare these distributions
using ￿rst and second-order stochastic dominance tools. When comparing two GL curves,
three situations can occur: (a) one curve lies above the other, (b) the two curves intersect,
(c) the two curves are identical. Our de￿nition implies that equality of opportunity
prevails in case (b) or in case (c). It is violated in case (a). Case (c) corresponds to strong
6See Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976).
7equality of opportunity. In practice, we estimate the conditional income distributions
and we perform non-parametric stochastic dominance tests at the ￿rst and second order.
Our tests implement the procedure developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and are
presented in the appendix.7
For two sub-populations A and B, we perform the following three tests independently
: (1) we test the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions of A and B; (2) we test
the null of FSD of distribution A over B and vice-versa; (3) we test the null of SSD of
distribution A over B and vice-versa.
If we fail to reject the null of test (1), we conclude to strong equality of opportunity
between A and B and only in that case. If test (2) or (3) accepts dominance of one
distribution over the other but not the other way round ( e.g. A SSD B and B SSD A)
we conclude that equality of opportunity is violated. It may occur that we reject the null
of test (1) and that test (2) or (3) conclude the two distributions dominate each other
((e.g. A SSD B and B SSD A)). In that case, we give priority to the result of test
(1) since it is a more powerful test of equality of distributions for any signi￿cance level.
Hence, in that case, we conclude that strong equality of opportunity is rejected but that
equality of opportunity, as de￿ned by de￿nition 3 is not rejected. Lastly, one should note
that, given our interpretation, conclusions of test (2) and (3) cannot contradict since the
null of (2) is included in the null of (3). Thus the conjunction of the results of the three
tests interpreted in this way cannot be inconsistent.
2.2.2 Inequality of opportunity index
One drawback of an ordinal characterization of equality of opportunity is that it does not
allow us to rank situations in which equality of opportunity is rejected. At the cost of a
loss of generality, it is also possible to build an index allowing to measure the degree of
inequality of opportunity.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to wonder what minimal properties such an index
must satisfy. Borrowing from the literature on inequality indexes 8, it seems reasonable
7For a related application of stochastic dominance tests, to the analysis of redistribution, see Sahn et
al. (2000)
8See for instance Sen (1997)
8to require the following properties.
1) Within-type Anonymity. The index must be invariant to any permutation of two
individuals with similar circumstances.
2) Between-type Pigou-Dalton Transfers Principle. Consider two circumstances s and
s0 such that the ￿rst one dominates the second one according to SSD . The index must
decrease if we perform any transfer from a s-type individual to a s0-type individual such
that (a) in the ex-ante distribution, the ￿rst individual is richer than the second individual
and (b) in the ex-post distribution, the ￿rst-type individual is not poorer than the second-
type individual.9
3) Normalization. If the CDFs corresponding to all circumstances are identical, then
the index must be equal to 0.
4) Principle of Population. The index is invariant to a replication of the population.
5) Scale invariance. The index is invariant to a multiplication of all incomes by a
positive scalar.
This list of properties de￿nes a class of indexes of equality of opportunity. Among it,
we construct and use a particular index, whose appeal is to relate to the most popular
index of inequality, the Gini index.
First we need to de￿ne a measure of the opportunities o￿ered to individuals with
given circumstances in the space of lotteries. Here we borrow from the literature on
the measurement opportunity sets (see Peragine (1999) for a survey). We measure the
feasible opportunity of a given lottery by the area under its GL curve. Indeed, any lottery
dominated according to the GL criterion belongs to this set. In an in￿uential contribution
to the measurement of opportunity, Pattanaik and Xu (1990) axiomatized the cardinal of
a discrete set as a measure of opportunity. Among the axioms introduced by the authors,
the following monotonicity property reads as follows. Given an opportunity set A and an
opportunity y which does not belong to A, A ∪ y o￿ers more opportunity than A. When
the opportunity set is continuous, counting elements of the opportunity set does not make
sense any more. A natural extension is to consider the area below the opportunity set as a
cardinal measure of opportunity and, for instance, Bensaid and Fleurbaey (2003) already
9From the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem, it seems clear that the equality of the two distributions
may be obtained through a ￿nite sequence of such transfers.
9suggested this measure when the opportunity set is a budget set.
Now, let us rank all circumstances according to twice the area under the GL curve,
starting from the smallest one. For circumstances s, this area is equal to µs(1 − Gs),
with µ denoting the mean and the G the Gini coe￿cient.10 The Gini-opportunity index








pipj(µj(1 − Gj) − µi(1 − Gi)). (7)
It computes the weighted sum of all the di￿erences between areas of opportunity sets.
Dividing by the mean income of the entire population µ make this index independent of
the wealth of the society. This index can be viewed as an extension of the Gini coe￿cient









(xj − xi) (8)
Therefore the GO index takes its value between 0 and 1. Comparison of formula (7) and
(8) allows to establish GO(x) ≤ G(x) and that the Gini-opportunity index increases with
the number of types.
Even if it is easily established that the Gini-opportunity index satis￿es the above
properties, distinctive properties of this index deserve more investigation. Here we do not
propose an axiomatization of the index, which will be the subject of further research.
3 Data description
Data requirements for comparing inequality of opportunity for income acquisition across
countries turn out to be even more stringent than for comparing inequality of outcome.
Indeed, the reliability of the empirical analysis calls not only for comparable measures of
individual disposable income. It also requires that individual background be measured in
a comparable and homogeneous way across countries.
10Yitzhaki (1979) already propose µ(1 − G) as a measure of satisfaction of the society, here of the
society made of the individuals of common circumstance.
103.1 Data sets and sample selection
The data used in the empirical analysis come from household surveys and micro-economic
administrative data for nine countries: Belgium, France, West-Germany 11, Great-Britain,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Data were collected
during the ￿rst half of the nineties. For each country, the data sets include information
on individual and household income, both pre- and post-￿sc, as well as information on
individual family background. As discussed below, the latter information will be used to
identify individual circumstances.
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the data sets used for each country.
These data were put together by national experts for the purpose of a previous interna-
tional comparison of income inequality and equality of opportunity, whose results were
presented in Roemer et al. (2003). 12 Although the national data sets were collected inde-
pendently, much e￿ort was expended to ensure the greatest degree of ex post comparability
across countries of the di￿erent variables used in the analysis.
Needless to say, providing comparable data for a large number of countries represents
a challenging task. The major advantage of the data used in this article, over harmonized
micro-economic income data sets often used in comparative research ( e.g. the Luxem-
bourg Income Study, the OECD , the ECHP or the World Bank data sets 13) is that it
provides information on individual circumstances, beside information on individual in-
come. Hence, being able to relate individual income to individual circumstances in nine
developed economies makes the data set used here extremely valuable. One further advan-
tage of these data is that these data include information on Sweden and the Netherlands,
two countries that are often absent form international comparisons of income inequality.
Samples used in the rest of the paper are restricted to households whose head is a
man, aged 25 to 40 at the time of the survey (25 to 50 in Germany).
11East-Germany has been discarded on the ground that, from an economic point of view, it remained
a distinct society from the West-Germany in the mid-nineties.
12For providing access to the data, we are grateful to Marx (Belgium data), Wagner (German data),
Jenkins (British data) Colombino (Italian data), Pommer (Dutch data), Aaberge (Norwegian data),
Fritzell (Swedish data), Page and Roemer (US data).
13See Gottschalk et al. (2000) for an analysis of income inequality from the LIS data, OECD (1998) for
OECD data, and Deiniger and Squire (1996) for a presentation of the World Bank data. However, these
normalized data set are not immune to statistical problem. See among others Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001) and Galbraith and Kum (2005) for an assessment.
11Table 1: Data bases
Year Obs.
Belgium PSBH Panel survey of Belgian households 1992 933
France BdF French Household Survey 1994 2 769
West-Germany GSOEP German socio-economic panel 1994 1 143
Great-Britain BHPS British household panel survey 1991 991
Italy SHIW Italian survey of household income and wealth 1993 1 392
Netherlands AVO Dutch facilities use survey 1995 1 758
Norway SLL Norwegian survey of level of living 1995 576
Sweden LNU Swedish level of living survey 1991 1 469
USA PSID Panel study of income dynamics 1991 1 119
3.2 Main variables
3.2.1 Individual circumstances
De￿ning the exact set of individual circumstances is a deep and debatable question. Be-
sides, in empirical work, observing this entire set is clearly out of reach. In this paper, we
examine the dependence of individual opportunity on a restricted set of circumstances,
namely circumstances relating to individual social origin, measured by parental education
of occupation.
Of course, social origin may in￿uence individual outcomes through a variety of channels
such as economic or genetic inheritance, or the transmission of preferences. Our interest
solely lies in determining the extent to which social background in￿uences individual
opportunity sets. Identifying these di￿erent channels is not the topic of this paper 14.
In fact, from the point of view of equality of opportunity, most authors 15 would agree
that substantive (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity requires compensating the
in￿uence of social origin on individual outcomes, regardless of the channel through which it
operates, as social origin lies beyond individual responsibility and choice. Nevertheless, we
recognize that this egalitarian principle may con￿ict with other social objectives or ethical
values. For instance, if the in￿uence of social origin is driven by the intergenerational
14A similar ambiguity arises in the growing literature on the measurement of the intergenerational
earnings elasticity (Solon, 1999)
15See for instance Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), and Roemer (1993) for a defense of that view.
12transmission of talent, equality of opportunity will go against allocative e￿ciency. In the
light of recent philosophical debates, it can also be argued, from a normative point of view,
that the above notion of equality of opportunity may contradict other ethical principles
such as self-ownership and freedom 16. In our view, these two criticism do not challenge
the consistency of the above notion of equality of opportunity nor dispute the relevance of
the comparison undertaken here. But they suggest that there may be a tradeo￿ between
di￿erent social and ethical objectives. Admittedly, this should be investigated empirically
using a more detailed description of the individual circumstances. However, the data at
our disposal prevent us from undertaking such an analysis of the di￿erent channels at
work. But it is often the case that international comparisons are made at this price.
For most countries in our data, individual social background is measured by the level of
education of the father. The only two exceptions are France and Great-Britain for which
we only observe the occupational group of the father. For each country, we partition our
sample in three categories, Ed1 to Ed3, where Ed3 denotes (a priori)the most advantaged
social background. When using father’s education, we account for speci￿cities of national
educational systems. When using information on father’s social group the classi￿cation
is as follows: for France, (1) farmers and manual workers, (2) clerks and (3) professionals
and self-employed workers; for Great-Britain, (1) farmers and unskilled manual workers,
(2) clerks and skilled manual workers (3) professionals and self-employed workers 17.
Table 2 presents the classi￿cation of social background in each country, as well as the
number of observations in each category. In partitioning our samples according to social
background, two constraints had to be taken into account. First the need for sub-samples
large enough to allow for the estimation of conditional income distributions. Second the
requirement of a meaningful partitioning, with respect to each country’s educational and
social structure. As a consequence of these two constraints, the comparability of our
classi￿cation across countries remains imperfect. In particular, one should be aware of
di￿erences in the relative size of each group across countries. 18 In France, Great-Britain,
16For instance, the in￿uence of social origin may driven by the genetic transmission of individual traits.
In this case, the self-ownership principle claims that di￿erences of outcome due to such constitutive traits
should not be compensated. See for instance Vallentyne (1997).
17For the French sample it is the occupational group when then individual was 16. In Great-Britain it
is the occupational group when he was 14.
18There are also di￿erences in the absolute size of each sub-sample and one may worry that could
13Table 2: Samples description
Observations Years of education
ED1 ED2 ED3 ED1 ED2 ED3
Belgium 425 341 167 < 10 10 − 12 >12
France 1274 703 792 ￿ ￿ ￿
G-Britain 402 307 282 ￿ ￿ ￿
W-Germany 857 142 144 < 10 10 − 13 >13
Italy 245 706 441 < 5 5 − 7 > 7
Netherlands 479 788 491 < 6 6 − 9 > 9
Norway 247 170 159 < 9 9 − 11 > 11
Sweden 825 414 230 < 8 8 − 11 > 11
USA 390 354 375 < 12 12 > 12
Number of observations and number of years of education of the parents for
the di￿erent sub-samples. ￿: information about the occupational group of
the parents have been used.
the Netherlands, Norway and the US, each group represents between 1/4 and 1/2 of the
overall population. This does not hold for Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden where
one group represents less than 1/6 of the overall population. This should be kept in mind
when analyzing the extent of equality of opportunity in section 5.
3.2.2 Income
We focus on two measures of individual income: gross pre-￿sc annual household income
and net disposable annual household income. 19 Analyzing both income measures allows
to examine the impact of ￿scal redistribution on inequality of outcomes and opportunity.
Since household income (both pre- and post-￿sc) incorporates a variety of di￿erent
income sources, similar sources should be taken into account for each country in order
to ensure cross-country data comparability. Gross pre-￿sc income includes labor income
(from both salaried and self-employed workers) and asset income. The only exception is
Belgium for which neither self-employment nor capital income is available. This could
hinder the comparability of our tests across countries. In order to assess the in￿uence of the sample size
di￿erences between, we have drawn independent random sub-samples for each country of the same size
as the smallest sample. It did not change any result.
19In most countries, taxes and employee social security contributions are simulated. Di￿erences across
countries regarding the share of social security spending ￿nanced by means of employer contribution,
employee contribution or income tax is likely to reduce the comparability across countries of gross pre-
￿sc income levels. Comparison of disposable income distributions across countries does not raise similar
concerns.
14lead to underestimate inequality in this country. 20 Labor income is measured gross of
any employee share of social security contributions. Taxes taken into account are income
tax as well as housing and property taxes. Transfers include unemployment bene￿ts, all
social security bene￿ts (related to sickness, disability, maternity, poverty ...), pensions,
child or family allowances and means-tested bene￿ts. Details of income sources taken into
account, for each country are provided in appendix table A.1. To account for di￿erences
in household size, income is normalized using the OECD equivalence scale. It amounts to
divide household income by the square root of the number of household members. Since
we do not want cross-country di￿erences in income per capita to in￿uence our comparison
of inequality of outcome and opportunity, for each country we divide household income
by the country’s mean household income.
4 Inequality of outcome
Before analyzing equality of opportunity, we ￿rst compare the extent of inequality of out-
come in the countries of our sample. Several papers have already compared the extent of
income inequality across countries, using harmonized data. The interest of the comparison
undertaken here is twofold. First, it can be seen as a test of the validity of the data used
in this paper. In fact, our results broadly concur with those of previous analysis. Second,
while most comparative papers have concentrated on the analysis of inequality indexes,
we also compare relative inequality across countries using the Lorenz dominance crite-
rion. The interest of this criterion lies in its greater generality. 21 We also pay particular
attention to issues of statistical inference and implement Lorenz Dominance tests. 22
We ￿rst discuss the ranking of countries which emerges from these tests before per-
forming a comparison with the results of other studies based on inequality indexes.
20For an analysis of asset holding and inequality in Belgium, see Bosck (1998)
21As shown by Atkinson (1970), Lorenz dominance among two distributions implies that all relative
inequality indexes will consistently provide the same ranking of these distributions.
22The methodology of these tests are presented in the appendix.
154.1 Lorenz Dominance tests
One way to get a ￿rst picture of income inequality in the nine countries is to compare
the shape of the income densities. The densities are estimated in logarithm using kernel
estimation23. Figure 1 gives the densities of the distribution of disposable income centered






















































Figure 1: Disposable Income densities estimated by kernel
The comparison of these densities reveals important di￿erences across countries in
the distribution of income. The contrast between Sweden and the US is striking with a
fairly symmetric distribution concentrated around its mean for the ￿rst one and a strong
23A Gaussian adaptative bandwidth kernel estimator has been used.
16right skew for the second one. The di￿erences between other European distributions and
the American one are less sharp. Norway shares with Sweden a signi￿cant polarization
around the mode but its distribution is less concentrated than the Swedish one. The
case of Belgium seems to be fairly similar to these two Nordic countries. The shape of
the distribution in the Netherlands, France and Germany is comparable and lies in an
intermediate position between Sweden and the US. The British density is closer to the
American one than to the distribution in continental Europe, with the exception of Italy.
This last country displays a distribution fairly close to the American and British ones.
To obtain a more precise picture of inequality we consider Lorenz curves. Figure 2
shows Lorenz curves for disposable income in each country. As for income densities, the
American curve is represented on each graph. Their analysis corroborates our previous
comments. On the top-left panel, it is apparent that the Belgian Lorenz curve is above the
Dutch curve, which itself dominates the US one. On the top-right panel, one can notice
that France and West-Germany have a similar level of inequality. The bottom-left panel
con￿rms that inequality is pretty much the same in GB, the US and Italy. Finally, on the
bottom-right panel, one can notice the signi￿cant gap between Scandinavian countries
and the United-States.
This visual inspection is con￿rmed by the results of the Lorenz dominance tests for
each pairwise comparison (table 3). These results do not lead to a complete ranking of
the countries. However three groups of three countries emerge from these tests. The
￿rst group is made of Sweden, Norway and Belgium. The second one includes France,
Germany and the Netherlands. The third one is composed of Great-Britain, Italy and the
US. The hierarchy between the three groups is obvious. All countries in the ￿rst group
Lorenz-dominate the countries of the second and third group, the countries of the second
group Lorenz-dominates the countries of the third one. The within-group ranking is less
clear. Within the ￿rst group, Sweden dominates Norway but not Belgium; Lorenz curves
for Belgium and Norway intersect. This apparently low level of inequality in Belgium
may partly be ascribed to the fact that our Belgian data do not take asset income into
account. Within the second and third group, for each pairwise comparison, dominance













































Figure 2: Lorenz curves for disposable income
4.2 Comparison with other studies
In order to assess the reliability of our data, we now compare our results to the ones
obtained in other studies, using harmonized income data. To this end, we estimate scalar
indexes of relative inequality in the nine countries. Estimates are reported in table A.2,
with bootstrapped standard-errors in brackets. For obvious reasons, inequality indexes
(Gini, CV) and inter-quantile ratios presented in table A.2 suggest a ranking of countries
that is similar to the one established in the previous section. Within-group di￿erences in
inequality indexes are not statistically signi￿cant, while between-groups di￿erences are.
One natural benchmark to gauge the reliability of our income data is to compare our
results to those obtained in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997; 2000), using data from the
18Table 3: Lorenz dominance tests
Sweden Norway Belgium France W-Germ Nether G-Britain Italy USA
Sweden - > ? > > > > > >
Norway - - ? > > > > > >
Belgium - - - > > > > > >
France - - - - ? = > > >
W-Germ - - - - - ? > > >
Nether - - - - - - > > >
G-Britain - - - - - - - = =
Italy - - - - - - - - ?
USA - - - - - - - - -
The symbols read as follows: >: The row dominates the column. <: the column dominates the row. =:
Lorenz curves are identical. ?: Lorenz curves are non comparable.
Luxembourg Income Study for the early nineties. Three points should be emphasized.
First our relative ranking of countries is to a large extent consistent with the results
presented in their studies. Second, for most countries, our estimates of inequality indexes
are lower than those reported in their studies. This may largely re￿ect di￿erences in
sample selection rules, and in particular the fact that we have restricted our samples to
a narrower age interval24. Third, two noteworthy di￿erences appear regarding the level
of inequality and the ranking of two countries : France and Italy. In our data the former
appears less unequal and the latter more unequal than in Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000),
both in absolute and relative terms 25. Regarding France, the di￿erence can be explained
by the fact that we use data from 1994, against 1989 or 1984 in their study. Moreover,
Hourriez et al. (2001) demonstrates that disposable income inequality decreases slightly
between these dates. Regarding Italy, their data refer to 1991, a year for which measured
inequality is markedly lower than in adjacent years, in particular 1993, the year used in
our study. For Italy as well as more generally, our results seem close to those of other
studies, both in terms of levels of inequality and of ranking of the countries: Bertola et
al. (2001) ￿nd a Gini of 0.348 for disposable income with LIS data in 1994, and rank
Italy among the more unequal countries in Europe. The same conclusion emerges from
Atkinson (1996), OECD (1998) and Smeeding et al. (2000) , who establish an overall
24For most countries, our samples are restricted to household whose head is aged 25 to 40, while their
sample includes all non-institutionalized households.
25According to the value of Gini coe￿cients displayed in Gottschalk and Smeeding’s study, France ranks
third with a Gini of 0.32 after the United-States (0.36) and Great-Britain (0.34). In our data income
inequality is larger in Italy and The Netherlands than in France. See table A.2.
19ranking similar to ours. Sastre and Trannoy (2001) ￿nd very similar results for Gini
indexes using LIS data 26.
Overall, our results closely mimic those obtained in various sources our data, which
suggests that we should be reasonably con￿dent in the validity of our income data for
international comparisons of inequality. We now turn to the analysis of inequality of
opportunity.
5 Equality of opportunity for income acquisition
The above conclusions for inequality of outcomes may not prevail for inequality of op-
portunity. In fact, in a country with limited inequality of opportunity, there can still
be important di￿erences in individual success (hence important inequality of outcome) if
individuals exert very heterogeneous e￿ort levels. Conversely, a low level of inequality of
outcomes is compatible with important di￿erences according to social origin. We ￿rst test
for equality of opportunity and then analyze di￿erences in the return and risk of income
lotteries conditional on social origin. Lastly, using our index of inequality of opportunity,
we examine how countries’ performance in terms of equality of opportunity compares to
their ranking in terms of overall inequality.
5.1 Dominance tests
Figure 3 draws the conditional distributions for primary and disposable income in each
country. Again, for each country, income is expressed as a fraction of the country’s mean
income. The results are then dimension-free and fully comparable to the results obtained
for inequality of outcome. Not surprisingly, having more educated parents is associated
with a higher level of income. Indeed in every country but one 27, the CDF for individuals
from more privileged origin is always below the CDFs for individuals coming from the two
less privileged social backgrounds.
26They ￿nd a Gini of 0.30 for USA, 0.30 for Great-Britain, 0.23 for Norway, 0.22 for Sweden, 0.26 for
Germany, and 0.28 for France. See Sastre and Trannoy (2001) table 2 p.329.
27In the case of Germany, the graph of the CDF for Ed3 is above the one for Ed2 for incomes greater
than 1.5 mean income.
20These graphs also reveal important di￿erences between countries in the magnitude
of the advantage conferred by more privileged backgrounds over less privileged ones.
Intuitively, this advantage corresponds to the gap between the CDFs corresponding to
the di￿erent social backgrounds. As apparent from these graphs, this distance varies
strongly from one country to another. For Sweden, the three conditional distributions for
Ed1 to Ed3 are strikingly close, suggesting that di￿erences in social background translate
into very small di￿erences in income. The same holds true, to a lesser extent, in Norway
where the gap between the income distributions of the di￿erent backgrounds is rather
modest.
This stands in marked contrast with the situation in Italy and the US where the gap
between the three distributions is important. In Great-Britain, the advantage conferred
to the most privileged group is still quite large but the gap between the second most
privileged group is less wide than in the US and Italian cases. Moreover, the income
distribution of groups Ed1 and Ed2 are closer together than in Italy and the US, suggesting
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Figure 3: Income distributions conditional on social background (cont.)
23The rest of the countries in our data (Belgium, France, Germany and The Nether-
lands) exhibit an intermediate degree of inequality of opportunity. There are signi￿cant
di￿erences in the income distributions o￿ered to individuals according to their social back-
ground. However, the distance between these distributions is smaller than in Italy and the
US. It should also be noted that in the former group of countries, especially in Belgium
and Germany, inequality of opportunity is more pronounced at the bottom of the social
hierarchy, to the extent that the gap between the distributions of groups Ed1 and Ed2
is larger than the distance between Ed2 and Ed3. This contrasts with the situation in
Italy, Great-Britain and the US. However, these di￿erences in the locus of inequality of
opportunity may partly re￿ect di￿erences in the classi￿cation used to partition our sample
according to social background rather than national speci￿cities.
Whether equality of opportunity prevails can be formally assessed using stochastic
dominance tests. The results appear in table 4. 28 The only country in which our equality
of opportunity criterion is satis￿ed for all groups is Sweden. In fact, this country exhibits
a situation described previously as strong equality of opportunity, as the pairwise tests
conclude to the equality of the three conditional distributions. It should also be stressed
that this strong requirement holds for both primary and disposable income. In all other
countries, according to our de￿nition, equality of opportunity does not prevail. There
exists at least one social background whose income distribution is dominated by that of
another group. It is nevertheless possible to rank these countries according to the number
of times the statistical tests conclude to dominance in the three pairwise comparisons. In
this respect, when focusing on comparisons of disposable income, Norway is the second-
least unequal (in terms of opportunity) since dominance is detected only in one case and
equality prevails in the two other comparisons. Great-Britain and Belgium come next with
two cases of dominance and one equality. In the German case, the three tests conclude
to dominance, but in two cases, only for second-order stochastic dominance, indicating
that the CDFs cross. Lastly, in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the US, the three
tests conclude to dominance at the ￿rst order, indicating that the hierarchy of social
28One can wonder if the di￿erences in results from a country to another come from the di￿erences in
samples size. We have checked that the results exhibited in table 4 are robust to di￿erence in sample size.
For instance, France results are the same when its samples are downsized to Norway’s ￿gures.
24backgrounds apparent on the graphs of the CDF is indeed very robust.
For seven countries out of nine, the results of the dominance tests for primary income
are identical to the results for disposable income. This can be interpreted as the weak
impact of redistributive policy on equality of opportunity as it is measured here. Hence
redistributive policy is not able to fully neutralize the e￿ect of the initial background on the
economic success of the next generation. Nevertheless Figure 3 reveals that redistributive
policy tends to partially o￿set the impact of social origin on individual income: in all
countries the CDFs for primary income, conditional on social background are always
further apart than the CDFs for disposable income.
25Table 4: Stochastic dominance tests
Belgium France
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1
Ed2 - - ? - - = - - <1 - - <1
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Great-Britain West-Germany
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - = <1 - = <1 - <1 <1 - <1 <2
Ed2 - - <1 - - <1 - - = - - <2
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Italy Netherlands
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1
Ed2 - - <1 - - <1 - - <1 - - <1
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Norway Sweden
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - = <1 - = <1 - = = - = =
Ed2 - - = - - = - - = - - =
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.A.
Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - <1 <1 - <1 <1
Ed2 - - <1 - - <1
Ed3 - - - - - -
The symbols read as follows: <1: The column dominates the row at the ￿rst order. <2: The column dominates the
row at the second order.=: CdF are identical. ?: CdF curves are non comparable.
265.2 Risk and return of the social lotteries
Using standard tools in risk theory, it is also possible to compare the income lotteries
attached to di￿erent social background in terms of their return and risk. Since for most
countries, the tests conclude to ￿rst-order stochastic among social backgrounds, we already
know that the expected income (i.e. the return) is usually larger for the more favored
social background. However, whether the lotteries o￿ered to the most advantaged type
are also less risky remains an opened question. 29
5.2.1 An almost equal risk of conditional lotteries
To focus solely on risk, we examine conditional distributions centered around their means,
and we draw Lorenz curves of these centered distributions. Comparing two distributions,
if the Lorenz curve of the ￿rst distribution is above the Lorenz curve of the other then
the ￿rst distribution will be considered less risky by all risk-averse individuals, whatever
the degree of their risk-aversion. Figure A.1 in the appendix presents the Lorenz curves
for the conditional distributions. Table 5 contains the results of the Lorenz dominance
tests. The sequence of tests is similar to the one used for stochastic dominance.
These results suggest that the degree of risk 30 of the income lotteries associated with
social background tend to be rather similar. For most countries, the Lorenz curves of
the di￿erent types are very close, especially for disposable income. Regarding the tests,
there is a surprisingly large proportion of pairwise comparisons for which we conclude to
the equality of the Lorenz curves: 19 times out of 27 for primary income and 17 times
out of 27 for disposable income. Even if we exclude all cases in which the uncentered
distributions are already equal, we conclude to the equality of the Lorenz curves in about
half of the cases. In each country there is at least one pairwise comparison for which
equality holds. This is true for both primary and disposable income. All three conditional
distributions display the same degree of risk in four countries for primary income (France,
West-Germany, Sweden and the US) and two countries for disposable income (Sweden 31
29This cannot be deduced from our previous empirical evidence since ￿rst-order stochastic dominance
is consistent with any behavior of the decision-maker toward risk.
30Two types of inequalities are mixed up in this measure of the degree of risk : transitory income
￿uctuations and di￿erences in permanent income among individuals of similar social origin.
31This comes as no surprise regarding Sweden since we had already noted that the conditional distri-
27and Belgium). For these countries, the equality of risks suggests that the impact of the
family background may simply be captured by a scale parameter. As a ￿rst approximation,
in these countries, the distribution of income conditional on social background, takes the
following multiplicative form :
xis = E(x | s)i (9)
where xis denotes the income of individual i with social background s, E(x | s) is the
expectation of income conditional on s and i is a random term independent of social
background.32 It should be stressed that equality in the degree of risk of the di￿erent
distributions is an interesting special case where the ranking of the distributions can be
achieved based solely on a comparison of the returns.
When equality of risks does not hold, the tests conclude to the crossing of the Lorenz
curves in one third of the cases. When the conditional Lorenz curves can be ranked,
the table indicates that less privileged backgrounds face more risky income lotteries than
more privileged ones in all cases for primary income, but only in one third of the cases
for disposable income. This indicates that redistributive policies tend to lower the risk
of the worst social lotteries. For instance France or West-Germany face a situation of
perfect equality of risk in primary income, but after income tax and transfers, the lottery
corresponding to the more privileged type is riskier than the other two. Suppose that we
are ready to assume, following Roemer, that the dispersion of incomes within a type is
the result of e￿ort only. Then a policy aimed solely at reducing inequality of opportunity
should leave the level of risk unchanged. Under this assumption, which is quite strong
admittedly, we conclude that the French and German redistributive policies are not solely
motivated by equality of opportunity.
butions are very similar in this country.
32For France, this result is robust to a ￿ner partitioning of social background (see Lefranc et al. (2004b)
for more details).
28Table 5: Lorenz dominance tests
Belgium France
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - < ? - = = - = = - = >
Ed2 - - = - - = - - = - - >
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Great-Britain West-Germany
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - = = - > = - = = - = >
Ed2 - - < - - = - - = - - =
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Italy Netherlands
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - < < - ? < - = < - = ?
Ed2 - - = - - = - - < - - <
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Norway Sweden
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - = ? - > = - = = - = =
Ed2 - - = - - = - - = - - =
Ed3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.A.
Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 - = = - ? =
Ed2 - - = - - =
Ed3 - - - - - -
The symbols read as follows: <: The column dominates the row. =: Lorenz curves are identical. ?: Lorenz curves
are non comparable.
295.2.2 Inequality of Return and inequality of Risk
So far our appraisal of risk relies on ordinal comparisons. Resorting to a cardinal mea-
sure provides additional empirical evidence, though at the price of lower robustness. We
compute two new indexes that measure respectively inequality of opportunity in terms
of returns to social lotteries and in terms of risk across social types. Both indexes derive
from the Gini-Opportunity (GO) index described in section 2. Our measure of inequality
of opportunity in returns to social lotteries (GO-return) is equal to the value of the GO
index when within-social-type inequality has been erased ( i.e. all individuals in a group
have an income equal to the average income of that group). Our measure of inequality
of opportunity in risk to social lotteries (GO-risk) is equal to the value of the GO index
when between-social-type inequality has been erased ( i.e. all social types have the same
mean income, but within-type inequality remains 33). The values of these indexes are
presented in ￿gure 4.
It turns out that the dispersion across countries in GO-return is slightly larger than
the dispersion in GO-risk. Indeed, the largest value of GO-return is about 7 times greater
than the smallest one, while the gap is only 5 times larger for GO-risk. It is instructive
to ￿gure out how these two components of inequality of opportunity shape in inequality
of opportunity. The two ￿gures illustrate how return inequality and risk inequality are
related to inequality of opportunity measured by the Gini-Opportunity index for our
sample of countries.
The left panel highlights the positive contribution of inequality of returns to inequality
of opportunity : the ranking of countries according to both dimensions appear positively
correlated. In the making of inequality of opportunity, inequality of returns stands out
as the dominant force.
The in￿uence of inequality of risks is more complex to ￿gure out. When interpreting
the right panel, we have to take into account the fact that a higher risk inequality is
not always detrimental to the least favored background. Indeed, in some countries, for
instance France, Great-Britain and Norway, the least advantaged social group is less risky
33More precisely, we equalize between-types inequality by a homothetic transformation of the condi-



















































































Figure 4: inequality of opportunity inequality of return and inequality of risk
than at least one of the two other groups, while in other countries like the Netherlands
and Italy the most privileged type is less risky than some other group (see Table 5). In
the former case, risk inequality mitigates return inequality a little bit, while in the latter
it exacerbates return inequality. Let us take some examples to see how this phenomenon
matters for the ranking of countries. Norway exhibits a larger return inequality than
Sweden and yet in terms of inequality of opportunity the ranking is reversed. Indeed
Norway displays a large inequality of risks to the detriment of the most privileged type.
The same explanation runs for the comparison of France and Belgium, and of Great-
Britain and the Netherlands: for France and Great-Britain, inequality of risk mitigates
inequality of returns.
5.3 Inequality of opportunity vs. inequality of outcomes
We now examine the relationship between inequality of opportunity and inequality of
outcomes among countries. To do so, we use the Gini index and the Gini-Opportunity
index, since resorting to a cardinal measure of inequality makes comparisons easier. The
values of these indexes are presented in table 6. Regarding the extent of inequality of
opportunity, three groups of country stand out. A ￿rst group composed of Sweden,
Norway and Germany with the lowest inequality of opportunity. An intermediate group
31composed of Belgium, France, Great-Britain and the Netherlands. And a group of high
inequality of opportunity composed of Italy and the US.











Figure 5 reveals a positive correlation between inequality of opportunity and inequality
of outcomes. Sweden and Norway are the least unequal countries according to both
concepts, while the United-States and Italy are the most unequal ones. The correlation
between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome is of course far from perfect. 34
If we draw a line that joins the two polar cases, two groups of outliers stand out: Belgium
and France lay above the line, The Netherlands, Great-Britain and Germany are below.
Given the size of our sample of countries, these facts should be interpreted with great
caution. However, this pattern of outliers might re￿ect attitude towards individual respon-
sibility rooted in religious and cultural ethics. European countries of catholic tradition,
here Belgium, France and Italy, apparently favor equality of outcome over equality of op-
portunity: in terms of opportunity, they are the most unequal countries among our sample
of European countries. The opposite seems true for European countries with a protestant
tradition, here the Netherlands, Germany and Great-Britain. This echoes a well known
theme in the sociology of religion. Max Weber (1904-1905) claimed that the devotion to
work that was one of the fundamental elements of capitalism and that modernity derived,
at least in part, from the Puritan e￿ort to turn work into a spiritual vocation. The respect
34If we were to exclude the US and Italy from our graph, very little dependence would have been detected
between the extent of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. Of course the omission of these
two large countries would have hampered the study. This observation tells us that the positive correlation
between the two concepts of inequality may depend on which country is included in the sample.
32of e￿ort which lies at the heart of the principle of equality of opportunity and which leads
Dworkin and others philosophers to prescribe the principle of natural reward may take
its root in the Protestantism. Consequently the idea of equality of opportunity would be
more easily absorbed by countries routinely exposed to the idea of respect of e￿ort that
country that are not.
Obviously the poor ranking of the US in terms of inequality of opportunity as well as
the preeminent position of Scandinavian countries in terms of equality of outcomes tells
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Figure 5: Inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity
6 Conclusion
We started by claiming that con￿ning analysis to inequality of outcomes is unduly re-
strictive. If inequality of opportunity were perfectly related to inequality of outcome, the
interest of focusing on opportunity would have been greatly reduced, given the consider-
able amount of results already collected regarding di￿erences across countries in income
inequality. Fortunately, our results suggest that inequality of outcome is far from perfectly
correlated with inequality of opportunity. On the one hand, countries that exhibit very
high (low) levels of inequality of outcome also experience high (low) levels of equality of
opportunity. On the other hand, the rankings of countries according to the two criteria
33are not identical, particularly for countries in the middle of the pack. Obviously, more
countries should be analyzed to obtain a more complete and de￿nite picture of the poten-
tial contrast or congruence between inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity
among the developed world.
This rather complex picture already suggests two lines for further investigation. First,
some policy instrument may achieve reduction in inequality of both outcome and oppor-
tunity. For instance, by reducing inequality of opportunity for education, by giving more
resources to schools located in poor neighborhoods, equality may be enhanced in the long
run on both dimensions. It may explain the achievement of equality of opportunity in
Sweden as well as the remoteness of this goal in the US. Analyzing the impact of such
policies may help to understand the extent of the correlation between inequality of out-
come and inequality of opportunity. This calls for further scrutiny of the mechanisms
through which inequalities of di￿erent types have been generated. It is clearly out of
the scope of this article but it may be pursued in further research. Then, our results
also suggest that the relative emphasis put on the two egalitarian principles (outcome vs.
opportunity) may vary across countries. A better knowledge of the political debate about
redistributive issues in each country may shed light on international di￿erences in this
respect.
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The testing procedure has been developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000). It can be
applied to any order of stochastic dominance. In this appendix we illustrate the case of
second order stochastic dominance test. First, we estimate the Lorenz or the General
Lorenz curves with their non-parametric estimator. From a sample of size NA, LA repre-
sents the estimated Lorenz curve of distribution A, and ΣA its variance-covariance matrix.
To compare the Lorenz curves of distributions A and B, we compute the di￿erence of the
two estimated vectors, noted γ = LA − LB. Insofar as the distributions A and B are
independent, the global variance-covariance matrix is given by: Σ = ΣA + ΣB.
To test the equality of the Lorenz curves: the null hypothesis is given by H0 : γ = 0.
It is then possible to show (see for example Beach and Davidson (1983) and Davidson and
Duclos (2000)) that under H0 the estimated vector ˆ γ is asymptotically normal, then:







The asymptotic distribution of the statistic T1, under the null hypothesis of equality :






)−1ˆ γ ∼ χ2
k
To test equality of the two Lorenz curves A and B, one only need to compare the
value of the statistic T1 with a χ2 at ￿ve or one percent.
To test relative dominance (ie: LA dominates LB), the two hypotheses are H0 : γ
∈ IR
k
+ against H1 : γ / ∈ IR
k
+. The Wald test statistic with inequality constraints has been




||ˆ γ − γ||
with ||x|| = x0Σ−1x. Kodde and Palm (1986) have demonstrated that T2 follow a




with w(k,k−j,Σ) represents the probability that k−j elements of γ be strictly positive.
The distribution of this mixture of χ2 is not tabulated but upper and lower bounds of
critical values are given in Kodde and Palm. It is either possible, if lower and upper bounds
do not enable to conclude to estimate critical values of the statistic T2 by a Monte-Carlo
procedure35.
35It is necessary to draw 10,000 normally multivariate vectors with expectation 0 and variance-
covariance matrix Σ, then to compute the proportion of vectors that have j positive elements (for j
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.1: Lorenz curves conditional on social background
(cont.)